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Many philosophers, realists and antirealists alike, agree with a characterisation of sci-
ence as an activity aimed at representing (selected aspects or parts of) the world. But 
what does it mean to scientifically represent something? The contributions to this spe-
cial issue approach this question from different angles. They naturally fall into two 
groups: the first three papers defend particular accounts of scientific representation 
while the latter two take issue with influential positions. 
 In ‘Defending the Structural Concept of Representation’ Andreas Bartels argues 
that scientific representation is based on homomorphism and addresses different criti-
cisms that have been levelled against this view, which leads him to introduce the dis-
tinction between potential and actual representations. Andoni Ibarra and Thomas 
Mormann’s ‘Scientific Theories as Intervening Representations’ takes up ideas going 
back to Pierre Duhem and Heinrich Hertz and develops a theory construing represen-
tations as complex commutative graphs, which serve as the basis for a discussion of 
the in vivo/in vitro problem in biochemistry. Mauricio Suárez and Albert Solé, in ‘On 
the Analogy Between Cognitive Representation and Truth’, point to communalities 
between the minimalist conception of truth and their own pluralist account of cogni-
tive representation, from which they muster support for a deflationary attitude to-
wards scientific representation in general.  
 In ‘Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories’ Roman Frigg first 
introduces three problems that every account of scientific representation has to come 
to terms with and then argues that the widely-held model-theoretic approach to theo-
ries does not provide a valid response to any of them. The last paper of this special is-
sue, Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen’s ‘There Is No Special Problem About Sci-
entific Representation’ offers a radically sceptical perspective on the entire debate by 
arguing that scientific representation is only a special case of a more general notion of 
representation, and that nothing over and above a well worked-out theory of the latter 
is needed to account for what happens in the sciences.  
 Finally, we would like to thank the editor of Theoria for supporting this project and 
Andrew Goldfinch for his invaluable assistance in the production of the final version 
of the papers. 
 
 Theoria 55 (2006): 5. 
